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1. Introduction 
Imperfect competition is a major concern in welfare analysis as it reduces consumer surplus 
and may erode entry barriers to new firms restricting their access to markets and thus, reducing 
production overall. Given that the manufacturing industry is very important to consumers as it 
is used to satisfy their primary needs, many studies have been carried out focusing on the 
market conditions across the OECD economies (Badinger, 2007; Christopoulou and 
Vermeulen, 2012; Afonso and Costa, 2013; Polemis and Fotis, 2016). The main argument is 
that rising market power in different sectors across the industry can be reflected by the price-
cost margin as any gap between the selling price and the cost of production enhance this 
particular outcome. If firms can set the price level above the cost of production, then consumer 
surplus is exploited and social welfare is reduced1. Consequently, the level of input factor 
demand will also be influenced resulting in inefficient resource allocation. 
The main aim of this study is to investigate the pricing decisions of 19 EU 
manufacturing industries disaggregated into 10 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 sectors in order to 
estimate the dynamics of the price-cost margin over 1995-2014. The markup ratio is calculated 
according to the formulations of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker and 
Eeckhout (2017) by taking into account the interactions between output and input factors. As 
the markup ratio reflects a degree of market power, the estimated values will suggest whether 
the constituent industries operate under imperfect competitive conduct. 
This study contributes to the literature of industrial organisation as it estimates the 
degree of imperfect competitive across of the constituent EU manufacturing industries. The 
markup ratio reflects the degree of competitive conduct and thus, the exercise of market power 
                                                          
1 Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) argued that firms may start price wars over periods of expansion in order to 
attract customers and thus, increase their market share. For this reason, prices may be higher over times of 
recession as firms tend to invest less in market share to minimise profit losses (Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1995, 
1996). Nevertheless, price wars may also occur over downturns as firms intend to secure their revenue given 
their access to information about their competitors’ liquidity constraints. 
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on the selling price. Subsequently, those decisions are investigated by employing important 
contributors to pricing decisions, such as the degree of liquidity constraints (Raddatz, 2006) 2, 
export-orientation (Görg and Warzynski, 2003) and the degree of productivity (Baqaee and 
Farhi, 2007) when proxy variables of government regulation and industrial size are taken into 
account. It is expected that the aforementioned factors will have a significant effect on the 
markup ratio and thus, on the pricing decisions of the EU manufacturing industries. To this end, 
the aforementioned relationship is tested by employing a VAR framework that takes into 
account the presence of various issues emerging in the dataset. For this reason, this study 
complements the literature of imperfect competition by developing an econometric analysis 
that provides robust results. 
 This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the empirical 
studies on the price-cost margin; section 3 develops the underlying methodology and the 
estimation process; section 4 presents the empirical results and discussion of pricing decisions; 
and section 5 offers a conclusion. 
2. Theoretical and Empirical Underpinnings 
The investigation of pricing decisions across various economies has been conducted over the 
years developing various techniques of estimating the value of the price-cost margin. The 
contribution of Hall (1988) utilises the assumption that the price level is equal to the marginal 
cost of production under perfect competition. However, given that the marginal cost of 
production is very difficult to observe, Hall showed that the nominal growth rate of the Solow 
residual is independent on the nominal growth rate of capital productivity. This implies that 
the price-cost margin can be estimated without directly observing the value of marginal cost. 
                                                          
2 Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001) and Hoberg and Phillips (2010) show how financial constraints affect pricing 
decisions and particularly, how firms with higher liquidity constraints are more likely to lower their prices in order 
to increase their revenue. 
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Subsequently, Roeger (1995) extended this framework by providing an unbiased market power 
estimator reflecting the dynamics of value added and input factors. Therefore, the markup ratio 
is expressed as the difference between the growth rate of value added and the growth rate of 
production inputs. 
 A different formulation of the price-cost margin has been developed by De Loecker and 
Warzynski (2012) that controls for unobserved productivity in the calculation of the output 
elasticity of an input factor. This approach is based on particular behavioural assumptions 
allowing flexible production technologies and the accommodation of dynamic input factors. 
De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) also highlight the importance of incorporating the factor of 
unobservable productivity in the markup ratio but they also correct measurement errors in sales 
which may lead to biased results. According to this formulation, significantly positive price-
cost margins were identified for the Slovenian and US manufacturing industries reflecting an 
increasing trend over the years. In particular, it is found that the US manufacturing markup is 
on average around 67%, reflecting the overpricing decisions of the industry. Strategic decisions 
are influenced by factors such as human capital or the labour and capital share in the production 
process that have increased the markup ratio over the years3. 
Additional studies provide similar results for the pricing decisions of the manufacturing 
industry. Martins et al. (1996) estimated the persistence of positive price-cost margins across 
14 OECD manufacturing industries, thus supporting the presence of imperfect competition. 
Badinger (2007) identified an imperfect competitive structure reflected by positive markups 
across 11 OECD industries over 1995-2000 suggesting that more integrated markets charge 
lower markups and experience higher productivity. Molnár and Bottini (2010) investigated the 
presence of market power in several EU manufacturing and service industries over 1993-2006. 
                                                          
3 De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) do not find a strong pattern across industries; however, smaller firms tend to 
charge higher markups influenced by the size of the industry they operate in.  
4 
 
The findings show that competition is more persistent in the sectors of the Scandinavian 
countries (excluding Sweden) and the United Kingdom, and lower in the sectors of Central 
European countries (see Polemis, 2014).  Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2012) also provided 
evidence in favour of imperfect competition across the industries of several European countries, 
concluding that the manufacturing industry on average is more competitive compared to the 
service industry4.  
Similar results were obtained by studies focused on export-oriented firms and sectors. 
Görg and Warzynski (2003) and Amountzias (2018) estimated the markup dynamics of UK 
exporting firms and concluded that they tend to charge a higher markup ratio compared to non-
exporting firms even under the pressure of foreign competition. This implies that exporting 
firms can charge different selling prices across different markets and consequently, they can 
exploit their power in some markets by charging a higher markup ratio to acquire higher profits. 
For this reason, international trade and input factors appear to have a significant effect on 
pricing decisions.  
De Loecker (2007) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) argued on the same line of 
reasoning that Slovenian exporters tend to charge a higher markup ratio compared to less 
export-oriented firms as a result of international trade. In addition, export-oriented firms tend 
to be more productive than their domestic counterparts and they enjoy higher productivity gains 
when they are exporting towards high income economies. This argument validates the study of 
Nicoletti and Scrapetta (2005) who mentioned that firms operating in highly competitive 
markets tend to increase their investment and productivity levels to keep up with their 
                                                          
4 However, Polemis and Fotis (2016) found no evidence of imperfect competition in the majority of 
manufacturing and service sectors of the Eurozone, the US and Japan. The main factor for this outcome lies on 
the openness of the sectors to international markets and deregulation resulting in competitive pricing strategies. 
Similar results are reported by Bottasso and Sembenneli (2001), Konings et al. (2005), Görg and Warzynski 
(2006) and Feenstra and Weinstein (2010) arguing that markups are reduced when firms are exposed to highly 
competitive conditions. 
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competitors and extend their market share. Bourlès et al. (2013) also support this outcome 
highlighting the fact that anti-competitive regulations tend to decrease multifactor productivity 
and thus, force firms to be less investment-oriented and charge a higher markup.  
An additional factor contributing to the formulation of pricing strategies corresponds to 
the degree of available liquidity accessed by firms as any funding invested in the production 
process may be reflected on the price-cost margin. Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995, 1996) 
argued that markups tend to be counter-cyclical when firms face financial constraints. This 
shows that lower price levels are charged in order to build market share and thus, increase 
revenue. Campello (2003) provided similar evidence suggesting that markups are higher in 
industries where firms face high levels of debt resulting in counter-cyclical behaviour. This 
also implies that firms heavily relying on external funding are more likely to increase their 
markup ratio by sacrificing part of their market share in order to face any potential negative 
shocks in demand. Lane (2012) and Braun and Raddatz (2016) also argued that firms with 
lower financial constraints will tend to charge a higher markup ratio as they can use their 
available liquidity reserves to substitute any potential loss in consumer demand as a result of a 
higher selling price. Therefore, firms operating in an intensive competitive environment and 
facing higher liquidity constraints tend to be more pro-cyclical as price wars intensify over 
periods of low consumer demand5. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Model formulation and data selection 
The markup ratio is estimated according to the formulation developed by De Loecker and 
Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017). It reflects the difference between 
                                                          
5 Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) contradict this argument supporting that price 
wars usually emerge over expansion periods because firms intend to increase their market share. 
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value added and the cost of production when the price elasticity of inputs is taken into account. 
The formulation of this ratio is presented in appendix. To this end, as the markup ratio is 
estimated across the constituent EU manufacturing industries, three major factors are taken into 
account in order to test their influence on the pricing decisions of the EU manufacturing sectors. 
In particular, the effects of liquidity constraints, exports and productivity are included in the 
current analysis as their influence is quite significant on pricing decisions (Bloch and Olive, 
2003; Afonso and Costa, 2013; Braun and Raddatz, 2016; Amountzias, 2018). The main 
regression is provided by 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝜇𝜇(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                                                                                            (1) 
where  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 is a proxy of financial underdevelopment for each industry i, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 is the ratio of 
manufacturing exports as a percentage of merchandise exports, 𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓 reflects productivity per 
worker expressed as gross manufacturing output over the number of workers, 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 is a proxy of 
market (de)regulation and 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 corresponds to the ratio of total value added over GDP for each 
manufacturing industry i. All variables are expressed in logarithms in order to obtain the 
elasticity values over the estimation process. 
[Table 1] 
 
The dataset consists of 19 EU manufacturing industries disaggregated into 10 2-digit 
NACE Rev.2 sectors over 1995-2014. In particular, the current dataset intends to extend the 
empirical insights of Afonso and Costa (2013), Apergis and Polemis (2015), Apergis et al. 
(2016) and Polemis and Fotis (2016) and explore the markup dynamics in selected countries 
across the European Union6. Subsequently, the effects of liquidity constraints, exports and 
                                                          
6 The constituent countries refer to Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
and UK. 
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productivity will be tested on the pricing decisions of the EU manufacturing industries when 
the factors of regulation and industrial value are taken into account.  
The main assumption of the model is that government intervention is the only external 
factor controlling for pricing decisions as any other policy factors are excluded. Moreover, the 
influence of international markets, as well as non-EU regulations are not taken into account 
suggesting that only EU-registered firms were included in the collection of industrial data. 
Finally, firm-behaviour and its effect on the industrial markup ratio is not taken into account 
due to data limitations. This implies that the model is quite aggregated as the behaviour of 
medium size firms may not be reflected in the aggregate markup ratio given that it usually 
represents the pricing decisions of the dominant firms. 
For this reason, the underlying model has two particular objectives. Initially, the degree 
of imperfect competitive conduct will be identified in order to observe the pricing strategies of 
the constituent industries. Subsequently, those decisions will be investigated by employing 
important contributors to the markup ratio, such as the degree of liquidity constraints (Raddatz, 
2006), export-orientation (Görg and Warzynski, 2003) and the degree of productivity (Baqaee 
and Farhi, 2007) when the proxies of government regulation and the size of the industry are 
taken into account. 
The model formulation captured by equation (1) reflects the pricing decisions of the 
constituent manufacturing sectors by taking into account various market factors. As the main 
intention of this study is to provide an interpretation of how pricing strategies are set according 
to competitive and financial forces, indicators of regulations, productivity, export orientation 
and industrial size were taken into account to investigate their effect on the markup dynamics. 
The theoretical foundations of equation (1) lie on the empirical work of Raddatz (2006) and 
Braun and Raddatz (2016) by attempting to model the effects of financial factors on the price-
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cost margin. The main argument raised by those studies is that industries with different 
structural characteristics, such as concentration and liquidity constraints, may exercise their 
power on the markup ratio as they control a significant percentage market share and they are 
not bound by funding restrictions. To this end, the role of institutions and regulators can shape 
market conditions and prevent large firms from exercising their power on consumers through 
the final selling price level. 
Nevertheless, as many limitations emerged in data collection, the current model is not 
able to investigate the full extent of the insights of Braun and Raddatz (2016) across the 19 EU 
manufacturing industries. Therefore, the best alternative was to employ similar proxies that can 
reflect financial and market decisions undertaken by sectors. In particular, equation (1) consists 
of two sets of variables: regulatory proxies and production indicators. The former set captures 
the financial and market regulations imposed by relevant institutions, while the latter set 
reflects the productions decisions of firms operating under the present regulatory framework. 
Moreover, given that the OECD statistics, the World Bank and the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) databases provided complete data up to the 2-digit sectorial level, equation 
(1) takes into account only 10 2-digit NACE Rev.2 sectors per country. For this reason, the 
main limitations of the present model are the exclusion of a liquidity constraints indicator that 
could complement the financial development proxy, as well as a detailed concentration ratio 
that could reflect competitive conditions on a firm-level analysis. Consequently, the main 
empirical insights are focused on the effects of regulations and production decisions and how 
they tend to shape the dynamics of the markup ratio. 
 The price-cost margin is estimated by employing equations (A1)-(A7) in the appendix. 
In particular, the data for output, variable and fixed costs have been obtained by the OECD 
statistics and they include the measures of gross output, intermediate inputs, labour 
compensation and gross capital formation. They have been used in the production function in 
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order to obtain output elasticity with respect to variable inputs. Subsequently, the final markup 
value is estimated by employing total value added observations suggesting that the only 
variable input included in the markup formulation is labour. Therefore, the cost of intermediate 
inputs is omitted from equation (A7)7. 
 The proxy of financial underdevelopment is formulated according to Braun and 
Raddatz (2016) by taking into account the available credit level to the private sector of each 
economy. The credit to GDP ratio has been obtained by the World Bank and the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS) databases. The main rationale for the inclusion of this measure 
is to investigate how restricted access to credit influences the price-cost margin dynamics as it 
is one of the main sources of investment. Braun and Raddatz (2016) suggest that financial 
underdevelopment leads to countercyclical markups, thus making firms more competitive over 
expansion periods. However, Amountzias (2018) showed that higher access to credit may have 
either a positive or negative effect on pricing decisions over different periods according to the 
conditions of the aggregate economy. Overall, credit provision is expected to have a significant 
effect on markups and therefore, it is included in equation (1). 
 The intensity of exports of each industry individually is expressed as the ratio of 
manufacturing exports over merchandise exports obtained by the OECD statistics. Görg and 
Warzynski (2003) supported that export-oriented firms tend to charge a higher price-cost 
margin due to the competitive advantage enjoyed by product differentiation. In particular, 
revenue obtained in international markets can be used in the domestic market to increase 
production funding and thus, increase the competitive advantage over non-exporting firms. 
This argument is supported by Bernard et al. (2003), De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and 
                                                          
7 A similar approach is followed by Rezitis and Kalantzi (2012) as total value added data is used in the markup 
formulation. 
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Amountzias (2018) as they provided evidence showing that exporters charge on average a 
higher markup ratio compared to non-exporting firms. 
 The indicator of productivity is expressed as gross manufacturing output over the 
number of employees in each industry. The observations were obtained by the OECD statistics. 
According to Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003, 2006) productivity is an essential factor for the 
development of any industry and thus, regulations in favour of liberalisation and promotion of 
the private sector enhance production overall. However, Baqaee and Farhi (2017) argued that 
higher markups in the US economy are followed by a slowdown in productivity, particularly 
due to the acquisition of market power. For this reason, the absence of sufficient regulations 
may provide the opportunity to some firms to charge a price level according to imperfect 
competitive conduct.  
This means that a control factor for productivity is the degree of regulation in the 
economy promoting the presence of the private sector. This indicator was obtained by The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators database and its values range between -2.5 and 2.5 with 
ascending order of government regulation. It reflects the efforts of governments to formulate 
and implement policies and regulations that promote private sector development in the market 
of products, thus enhancing market liberalisation. The final control factor is the value of each 
manufacturing industry to GDP, expressed as the ratio of total value added over gross aggregate 
output. It is employed as a proxy for the size of the manufacturing industry over the years 
compared to the size of the aggregate economy8. Even if the value to GDP ratio is quite stable 
over the years across the constituent manufacturing industries, it is rather important to include 
it into equation (1) as an industrial size indicator. 
                                                          
8 This particular ratio is formulated by including total value added data of the constituent 2-digit sectors. More 
suiTable indicators refer to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the concentration ratio or the size of the four largest 
firms in the sector (Domowitz et al., 1988; Konings et al., 2005; Olive, 2008; Bellone et al., 2016). However, 
given firm-level data limitation, the value to GDP indicator for the whole manufacturing industry is selected. 
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3.2. VAR framework 
As the panel set of this study consists of 19 EU manufacturing industries, it is expected that 
some form of cross-section dependence will emerge in equation (1). For this reason, Pesaran’s 
(2004) cross-section dependence tests (LM and scaled tests) are employed to investigate the 
presence of contemporaneous correlation. Both tests take into account the average value of all 
pair-wise correlation coefficients of the OLS residuals estimated by the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) regression of each variable. The null hypothesis reflects the absence of such 
correlation and thus, a simple pooled least squares model can be estimated. The alternative 
hypothesis suggests the presence of contemporaneous correlation, meaning that alternative 
estimation techniques must be applied9. 
 Subsequently, the integration order of the constituent panel series has to be tested in 
order to decide whether a panel Vector Autoregression (VAR) framework must be applied. In 
particular, the unit root tests applied on the variables of equation (1) correspond to Pesaran’s 
(2007) cross-section ADF tests (CADF) where the initial ADF regression is augmented by the 
cross-section average values of lagged levels and first differences. This transformation 
accounts for the presence of cross-section dependence across the panel set and thus, it provides 
more robust results compared to the simple ADF regression. If at least one of the series is found 
to be non-stationary at levels, the presence of cointegration must be tested in order to explore 
the presence of a long-run relationship amongst the panel series.  
Therefore, Westerlund’s (2008) cointegration test is applied on equation (1) which 
takes into account the presence of cross-section dependence by providing the group and the 
panel Durbin-Hausman test statistics. The null hypothesis of both statistics refers to the absence 
of a long-run relationship. This approach does not require prior knowledge about the order of 
                                                          
9 Two of the most popular techniques refer to the random and fixed effects model (Baltagi, 2001). However, if 
the panel series are first order integrated, then a panel VAR framework must be taken into account. 
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integration of the constituent variables. The presence of cross-section dependence is captured 
by a factor model in which the residuals are obtained by common unobservable factors across 
the constituent industries (Auteri and Constantini, 2010). Moreover, Pedroni’s (2004) statistics 
are employed in order to support the outcome provided by the group and the panel Durbin-
Hausman test statistics 10 . Finally, the presence of long-run stability is tested in order to 
investigate whether any structural breaks emerge in the sample. The CUSUM and CUSUM 
squares tests are employed developed by Page (1954) and Khan (1978) along with the structural 
stability tests proposed by Andrews (1993), Andrews and Ploberger (1994) and Bai and Perron 
(2003). The main purpose of those tests is to identify the presence of any break emerging over 
the underlying period which may reduce the accuracy and validity of the estimated values. 
If the presence of all the aforementioned issues is confirmed, a panel Vector Error 
Correction model will be formulated in order to capture the long-run relationship between the 
markup ratio and liquidity constraints, export-orientation and productivity. However, given the 
presence of contemporaneous correlation, a pooled least squares estimator will result in 
inefficient inferences. The most suitable estimator refers to the Common Correlated Effects 
(CCE) estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006). The formulation process is similar to the one of 
the CADF unit root test, where the main regression is augmented by the cross-section average 
values of the countries over the 20 years of the sample. This approach allows individual specific 
error terms to be heteroskedastic and serially correlated. For this reason, the CCE estimator is 
preferable compared to the Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) or the Dynamic OLS (DOLS) 
estimators as they result in incorrect inferences under the presence of cross-section dependence 
(Phillips and Sul, 2003). 
                                                          
10 It is worth mentioning that Pedroni’s (2004) test statistics do not take into account the presence of cross-
section dependence, thus assuming that the panel series are not subject to contemporaneous correlation. 
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Moreover, alternative estimation techniques can be taken into account, such as the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) employed by several studies (Klette, 1999; 
Wooldridge, 2009; De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012). The GMM technique employs a list of 
instruments taking into account the presence of endogeneity when any form of correlation 
emerges between the dependent variable and at least one of the explanatory variables. 
Consequently, it is an advantageous estimator as it eliminates the problem of inconsistency 
providing robust results.  
As presented by Hansen (1982) and Arellano and Bover (1995), in conjunction to 
endogeneity, the weighted matrix can be formulated accordingly in order to take into account 
the presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (Newey and West, 1987, 1994). For 
this reason, it provides a credible alternative for checking the robustness of the CCE results 
that fail to reflect the presence of endogeneity. To this end, both estimators suffer from 
omissions but if they are tested together they can provided robust results and conclude whether 
contemporaneous correlation and endogeneity significantly shape the final estimates. 
The final step of this process identifies the short-run effects amongst the variables by 
employing particular causality tests. The non-Granger causality test developed by Dumitrescu 
and Hurlin (2012) is employed by taking into account stationary series using the Z-bar statistic 
for the fixed coefficients of the constituent variables under a panel VAR framework. The null 
hypothesis indicates the absence of causality in any cross-section of the panel set obtained by 
the Wald statistic. In particular, the Wald statistic is obtained for each cross-section and 
subsequently, the average value of those statistics is calculated11. The main advantage of this 
approach is the assumption that coefficients are heterogeneous across the cross-sections12.  
                                                          
11 Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) argued that this value converges to normal distribution under the null 
hypothesis when N and T tend to infinity. 
12 This assumption however, is not included in Granger’s (1969) causality test.   
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Moreover, the Impulse Responses Functions are presented to test the responsiveness of the 
markup ratio to a standard deviation shock caused by the remaining variables of the model. 
 Overall, the aforementioned process is applied in the 19 EU manufacturing industries 
in order to explore how markup dynamics are influenced by the effects of liquidity constraints, 
export orientation and productivity. As the econometric process takes into account the presence 
of many issues emerging in the dataset, this model adds value in the literature of imperfect 
competition because it employs a VAR framework under which robust long-run results are 
obtained and the short-run behaviour of the constituent variables is observed. This addition 
differentiates the current model from the models of previous studies as they either employ a 
fixed or random effects model (Christopoulou and Vermoulen, 2012; Polemis, 2016) or they 
utilise the GMM estimator without taking into account the presence of stationary and cross-
section dependence (Badinger, 2007; Braun and Raddatz, 2016; Bellone et al., 2016). Therefore, 
the consideration of a VAR framework under which structural stability and contemporaneous 
correlation are taken into account improve the robustness of the empirical results and their 
importance for the EU market. 
4. Empirical results and discussion 
The empirical process of this study takes into account two steps. The first step estimates 
equation (A7) for the aggregate EU manufacturing industry, each EU manufacturing industry 
and each constituent 2-digit level sector. The second step, utilises the industrial estimates of 
the previous step for each country and estimates equation (1) under a panel VAR framework. 
The main rationale of this process is to initially investigate the dynamics of the markup ratio 
in the EU area and conclude, whether the presence of imperfect competition is significant in 
that region.  
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Afonso and Costa (2013) argued that markup ratios tend to be pro-cyclical to 
productivity shocks and counter-cyclical to fiscal spending shocks. For this reason, the degree 
of regulation in markets highly affects the competitive behaviour of the participants. Polemis 
and Fotis (2016) provided evidence that more deregulated markets tend to be more competitive 
and thus, charge a lower price-cost margin to attract more customers. This rationale results in 
insignificant evidence of imperfect competition at least across the countries of the Eurozone. 
Additional studies explore the pricing decisions of the manufacturing industries in the EU 
countries concluding that there is evidence of imperfect competition but the price-cost margin 
is close to unity13. 
[Table 2] 
[Figure 1] 
[Figure 2] 
 The estimation of equation (A7) for the 19 EU countries provides significant evidence 
of imperfect competition. Table 2 reflects the markup ratios of the constituent 2-digit level 
sectors of the 19 EU manufacturing industries. The values show that in every sector, the price-
cost margin is higher than unity, thus reflecting the presence of overpricing decisions which 
may also be an indicator of imperfect competition14. In particular, Ireland and Slovak Republic 
exhibit the highest markup ratio across the constituent industries. It is equal to 2.01 and 2 
respectively showing that the selling price is approximately 100% higher than the marginal 
cost of production. On the other hand, Luxemburg and the UK exhibit the lowest markup ratio 
which is equal to 1.38 and 1.41 respectively, thus reflecting a relatively lower degree of 
imperfect competitive conduct. This outcome is consistent with similar studies arguing about 
                                                          
13 Some of these studies refer to Belgium (Dobbelaere, 2004), Greece (Polemis, 2014; Amountzias, 2017), Ireland 
(Boyle, 2004), Slovenia (De Loecker, 2007), Sweden (Wilhelmsson, 2006) and the UK (Görg and Warzynski, 
2003, 2006; Amountzias, 2018). 
14 Nevertheless, De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) support that higher markup ratios may not always reflect market 
power. If the source of that increase is technological change that reduces variable costs but increases fixed costs, 
then firms will not drop the selling price as they need to generate additional revenue. 
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overpricing decisions and the presence of imperfect competitive conduct across the OECD 
economies (Martins et al., 1996; Molnár and Bottini, 2010; Christopoulou and Vermeulen; 
2012). 
In particular, figure 1 shows that the price-cost margin of the constituent manufacturing 
industries tends to increase over 1995-2014 by reaching its climax in 2007 before the eruption 
of the global financial crisis in 2008. This means that the markup ratio tends to be pro-cyclical 
as 1995-2007 was a period of expansion for the EU on average. Moreover, the lowest values 
are obtained over 1996 and 2009. The former value may be a result of the Single European 
Market (SEM) implementation completed in 1992 (European Commission, 2012). Even if 
there are no available estimates over 1992-1995, the falling trend over 1995-1996 could reflect 
this particular outcome. The latter value reflects the effects of the global financial crisis which 
caused a fall in aggregate demand over the following years and thus, a fall in the price-cost 
margin so that firms can minimise their losses in terms of market share (Ollivaud and Turner, 
2015). 
 Figure 2 illustrates the estimated markup ratio for 4 regions within the EU categorised 
by regional criteria15. In particular, the countries of the east and south blocs appear to charge a 
higher markup ratio compared to the EU average, while the central bloc seems to be the most 
competitive. The markup dynamics provide approximately the same trend across the 4 blocs 
reflected by a pro-cyclical pattern: increasing markup ratios over 1995-2007 and a fall in 2009.  
However, across the countries of the south EU bloc the price-cost margin appears to 
rapidly increase over 1999-2002 and then gradually fall. An interpretation for this pattern may 
lie on the introduction of the euro currency across those countries over that period16. As the 
                                                          
15 Central EU countries correspond to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg and the Netherlands. North 
EU countries include Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the UK. East EU countries refer to Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia. South EU countries are Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. 
16 Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy joined the Eurozone in 1999 while Greece joined in 2001. 
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new revaluated currency resulted in higher purchasing power parity to consumers, the 
manufacturing firms increased the price-cost margin of their final products in order to exploit 
part of that surplus. The subsequent fall of the markup ratio over 2002-2006 may reflect the 
normalisation of the manufacturing firms’ pricing decisions following the exogenous shock 
caused by the introduction of the new currency. This may have happened either through lower 
selling prices or higher input costs. To this end, there is a degree of convergence between 
Central and Northern Europe. Nevertheless, the markup ratio of Eastern and South Europe 
diverges from the EU average dynamics reflecting overpricing decisions in the domestic 
manufacturing industries. This outcome could be interpreted on the basis of lacking regulatory 
reforms and sufficient competition frameworks that restrict competitive interactions and 
provide power to a few firms (OECD, 2014a). 
The markup ratio pattern across the EU countries also supports the findings of OECD 
(2014b) arguing that competition in the manufacturing industry is essential in order to minimise 
consumer surplus exploitation. One of the main factors that could enhance competition and 
reduce the costs of production is technological improvement in order to improve the efficiency 
of the production process. Under this rationale, firms can keep up with consumer preferences 
and also, consumers can purchase products under a selling price level close to the cost of 
production. For this reason, those incentives must be enhanced across the whole industry by 
undertaking the necessary decisions. 
 Consequently, investment decisions and deregulatory actions are the main contributors 
shaping the competitive conditions across the manufacturing sectors of the EU countries 
promoting entrepreneurial activities and innovation overall (Nicoletti and Scrapetta, 2005; 
OECD 2018). Various programmes such as the environmental compliance programme (OECD, 
2003) and competition assessment toolkits (OECD, 2014a) have contributed to this outcome in 
order to eliminate inefficient barriers in the markets that restrain the economic activities of the 
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private sector and generally, of new entrants in the industry. Moreover, the introduction of new 
technologies enhancing economies of scales across the manufacturing firms may also provide 
opportunities to the incumbent firms to expand their trading activities in the international 
markets by developing and promoting their products to meet the needs of international demand. 
 For this reason, the next step of the analysis utilises the markup ratios for each industry 
over 1995-2014. It tests their relationship with the degree of financial underdevelopment of the 
manufacturing industries, their export orientation and productivity, when the factors of market 
regulation and industrial size are taken into account. 
[Table 3] 
[Table 4] 
 
[Table 5] 
Table 3 provides the results of Pesaran’s (2004) cross sectional dependence tests. Every 
panel series is found to be subject to contemporaneous correlation and thus, a simple panel lest 
squares estimator will result in incorrect inferences. For this reason, the order of integration of 
each series will be investigated as a panel VAR model has to be employed in the presence of 
unit roots. Table 4 provides significant evidence of first order integration in the panel series of 
equation (1), excluding the series of financial underdevelopment which is stationary at levels.  
Subsequently, the presence of cointegration must be explored to check whether a long-
run relationship persists amongst the constituent panel series. Pedroni’s (2004) and 
Westerlund’s (2008) tests are employed and their results are presented in Table 5. As the 
presence of cross sectional dependence persists in the model, the Durbin-Hausman statistics 
are mainly taken into account. Given that both of them are significant at least at the 5% level 
of significance, the presence of a long-run relationship cannot be rejected and thus, the error 
correction mechanism must be included in the panel VAR framework. The PP and ADF 
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statistics also point to this particular outcome, validating the fact that the series of equation (1) 
are cointegrated under the presence of cross sectional dependence. 
[Figure 3] 
[Table 6] 
 Moreover, the presence of long-run stability is tested in order to investigate the presence 
of structural breaks emerging in the sample. Figure 3 presents the recursive estimates for each 
coefficient in equation (1) along with the CUSUM and CUSUM squares diagnostics that test 
the long-run stability of the model (Page, 1954; Khan, 1978). The results are presented in Table 
6 and show that in the long-run there is no significant sign of structural breaks in the markup 
formulation. This outcome is also validated by the structural stability tests proposed by 
Andrews (1993), Andrews and Ploberger (1994) and Bai and Perron (2003) as they do not 
reject the null hypothesis of no breakpoints over 1995-2014. 
[Table 7] 
 
 Consequently, equation (1) is estimated under the CCE estimation technique proposed 
by Pesaran (2006) in order to capture the presence of contemporaneous correlation. Moreover, 
the Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) estimator, the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
and the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) techniques are employed to test the robustness 
of the estimates and check whether the issue of cross sectional dependence results in any 
significant changes across the final estimates17.  
Every estimation technique provides similar results for the effects of the explanatory 
variables on the markup ratio across the 19 EU manufacturing industries. The FMOLS 
estimator reports an insignificant value for the elasticity of the markup ratio with respect to 
                                                          
17 The GMM estimator is employed in order to check whether any potential endogeneity in the model affects the 
final estimates (Hansen, 1982; Arellano and Bover, 1995). The ARDL model is used as a test of robustness for 
the CCE estimations, as suggested by Pesaran et al. (1999). 
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regulation and financial underdevelopment, while the GMM and the ARDL techniques report 
insignificant values only for the markup elasticity with respect to regulation and exports 
respectively. For this reason, it is evident that the presence of cross sectional dependence must 
be included in the estimation process as the CCE estimator provides significant results for every 
variable. 
In particular, the price-cost margin elasticity with respect to financial 
underdevelopment appears to be negative and quite inelastic. This means that as the 
manufacturing industries struggle to get additional credit for their activities, they tend to reduce 
the price-cost margin in order to increase their market share and thus, their revenue. Moreover, 
liquidity constrained industries are expected to invest less in innovation. If innovation is limited, 
the quality improvement of products will also be limited and they cannot gain competitive 
advantage over their competitors who may be less liquidity constrained.  
This outcome is supported by the findings of Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001) and Busse 
(2002) who argued that when firms with liquidity constraints compete intensively, it is more 
likely that they will follow predatory strategies and start price wars, especially over downturns. 
As the constituent manufacturing sectors have more access to credit acquisition, they tend to 
increase the price-cost margin and use that credit as a profit cushion against any market share 
losses when the final selling price is higher18.  
However, such findings contradict several studies arguing in favour of lower markup 
ratios when firms have higher access to credit (Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1995, 1996; 
Campello, 2003; Braun and Raddatz, 2016). Therefore, it can be concluded that the pricing 
decisions across the constituent EU manufacturing industries significantly depend on credit 
                                                          
18  Makaew and Maksimovic (2013) also note the importance of cash flow in the production decisions of 
developing economies. Liquidity constraints have a significant and highly elastic effect on final output and thus, 
on entrepreneurial activity. 
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acquisition. Lower liquidity constraints tend to increase the price-cost margin because they 
reflect a higher selling price as a result of higher investment costs19. 
This argument is also supported by Kraemer-Eis et al. (2017) as small and medium 
sized manufacturing firms are very important elements of manufacture success given the 
inelastic nature of the products. As such firms may not always be able to get financial support 
for their activities, various institutions must step in and provide that funding in order to operate 
efficiently and thrive under a competitive market structure, usually dominated by large firms. 
To this end, loans to such firms have been provided by the European Investment Fund since 
2013 and particularly, to firms operating in economies that faced a recessions over the last 
years, such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (OECD, 2018)20. The importance of such 
lending provides the opportunity to absorb any negative shocks caused by a decline in 
aggregate demand and also, supply those products at an affordable selling price for customers. 
Therefore, liquidity constraints pose a significant threat to manufacturing production and 
competition and if left unchecked, it could lead to high market concentration as funding will 
be the main competitive advantage of large firms. 
 Subsequently, a secure channel of liquidity provision may also encourage firms to 
expand their international activities and form new supply chains. For this reason, the second 
element of equation (1) corresponds to the elasticity of the markup ratio with respect to exports. 
The main rationale of this coefficient is to investigate the pricing decisions of export-oriented 
industries and how they tend to set their price level. The coefficient is significant and equal to 
                                                          
19 This behaviour is also consistent with the speculative motive. As firms have greater access to liquidity, they 
will charge a higher markup ratio to exploit consumer surplus and substitute any loss in consumer demand with 
available credit. For this reason, only liquidity constrained firms act according to the precautionary motive as they 
charge a lower price-cost margin in order to increase their market share and ultimately, their revenue (Kimball, 
1991). 
20 Moreover, the Euro Area banks continue to ease the credit standards for small and medium sized firms 
applying for business loans. However, firms operating in the Southern European economies find it more difficult 
to secure a loan compared to firms operating in Central and Northern European economies (OECD, 2018). 
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0.21. This reflects the fact that more export-oriented sectors tend to charge a higher price-cost 
margin as they operate in more than one market. This outcome supports the empirical evidence 
of similar studies suggesting that exposure to international markets may result in market power 
acquisition in domestic markets due to a  high degree of efficiency (Görg and Warzynski, 2003; 
Bernard et al., 2003; De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012).  This means that generated revenue 
from a particular market can be invested in the economic activities of another market and thus, 
provide additional liquidity in the production process. 
 In particular, as austerity policies were implemented across the EU economies, 
domestic firms sought opportunities in international markets given that the euro currency 
became weaker relative to other currencies (Sinn, 2014; Hardiman et al., 2016). Bernard et al. 
(2003) supported that more efficient producers may set higher markup ratios compared to their 
competitors as their main tool of competition is the quality and not the price level of the final 
product. When firms operate in many markets, they adjust to many market characteristics and 
strive to efficiently utilise their gains. For this reason, export-oriented firms tend to be more 
productive than their domestic counterparts as various types of investment are incorporated in 
the production process (De Loecker, 2007; Baumers et al., 2016). 
 This outcome is also supported by OECD (2018) because exports significantly depend 
on the economic conditions surrounding international markets and thus, the pricing strategies 
adopted by the participants. As the economic outlook in the EU area is steadily improving, 
consumer confidence is restored given that aggregate demand is constantly increasing. To this 
end, manufacturing firms must comply with the new demand levels utilising their equipment 
and capacities constraints in order to effectively meet consumer preferences.  
 The result of the aforementioned actions undertaken by the manufacturing sectors will 
lead to productivity improvement expressed as output per worker. It is expected that more 
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productive sectors tend to increase the price-cost margin because final output reflects all forms 
of investment (Hall, 1988). Baqaee and Farhi (2017) argued that changes in productivity 
involve two major components: changes in allocative efficiency and technological productivity. 
As the value of gross output reflects every factor utilised in the production process, including 
technological progress as captured by equation (A5b), the current productivity index 
incorporates both measures as an average value per worker.  
However, an important element of productivity improvement usually reflects the 
competitive conditions in the market. As markets tend to be less competitive, firms may not 
have the incentives to invest in their production process and thus, productivity may become 
stagnant or even fall. Andrews et al. (2016, 2017) support that the productivity gap in the EU 
manufacturing industries is quite significant and increasing because there is insufficient 
diffusion of knowledge and technology from the leading to the lagging firms. One important 
factor contributing to this outcome is the presence of many administrative and regulatory 
barriers that put small and medium sized firms to a disadvantageous position as they need more 
time and funding in order to compete with the leading firms. 
An additional factor complementing production performance and pricing decisions is 
government intervention. The regulation index employed in this study captures the promotion 
of market-friendly policies removing barriers to private entrepreneurial activity. The effect on 
the price-cost margin is found to be significant and negative. This outcome suggests that as 
markets become more competitive through trade liberalisation, sectors tend to reduce the 
markup ratio as a mean of competition (De Loecker et al, 2016). This outcome is also supported 
by the study of OECD (Meloni, 2010) arguing that the quality of regulatory policy can erase 
inefficient barriers restricting competition in the manufacturing industry. This happens by 
promoting incentives of intensive price competition through which market share expansion 
rather than consumer surplus exploitation is the main motivation of firms. To this end, 
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regulations should be implemented in order to promote competitive actions in any industry. In 
conjunction with liquidity provision by financial institutions, it should also provide the 
opportunity to manufacturing firms to improve their technology and compete in a healthy 
environment in order to meet consumer demand and expand their trading activities (Xu and 
Byoun, 2015). 
Bourlès et al. (2013) and Ollivaud and Turner (2013) argued that competitive upstream 
pressure tends to increase productivity in the markets as firms strive to compete for market 
share. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) also suggested that pro-competitive reforms are expected 
to increase productivity and investment overall, thus leading to higher GDP per capita growth 
rates. Consequently, more productive sectors tend to charge a higher price-cost margin 
reflecting all forms of investment activity in the production process. 
The last control factor in the model is the value of each manufacturing industry to GDP 
serving as an indicator of market value. Given the positive value presented in table 6, as the 
value of the industry increases over time, markup ratios tend to increase as well, reflecting a 
form of market power. This outcome is consistent with the findings of Konings and 
Vandenbussche (2005), Konings et al. (2005) and Amountzias (2018) who argued that market 
concentration may result in higher markup ratios across the industry. Although the current 
value ratio is far from providing an accurate indicator of concentration or the size of the 
constituent sectors, it is employed as a proxy of manufacture contribution to national output. 
For this reason, the only conclusion that can be drawn reflects the activities of the 
manufacturing industry as an aggregate entity. This suggests that as the industry’s contribution 
to GDP becomes larger over time, the price-cost margin tends to increase as well21. 
                                                          
21 The model was re-estimated by adding time dummy variables excluding the period of the global financial crisis 
(2007-2010). The results remained consistently similar as the signs were the same with the ones reported in Table 
6. There were small variations in the significance level but the estimates reflected the same outcome. Therefore, 
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[Table 8] 
 The aforementioned results are also validated by the short-run causality test presented 
by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012). In particular, they reflect significant causality running from 
all explanatory variables to the markup ratio, except from the value to GDP ratio of the 
manufacturing industry. Liquidity constraints are only influenced by the degree of market 
regulation, suggesting that competitive conditions affect the liquidity needs of sectors in the 
short run. Export intensity is caused by liquidity constraints and market regulation, which once 
again validates the arguments of Görg and Warzynski (2003) and De Loecker and Warzynski 
(2012) about the role of international trade and exposure to international markets. 
 The indicator of productivity is only caused by the value of the manufacturing industry 
to GDP supporting the argument that larger industries tend to contribute more resources to the 
production process by enhancing productivity overall. Therefore, in the long-run, higher 
productivity will increase the price-cost margin by reflecting all these forms of investment. 
Market regulation depends on the pricing decisions of the sectors, as well as their access to 
liquidity. As these parameters may reflect competitive conduct, regulatory decisions are formed 
according to their short-run dynamics. Finally, the value of the manufacturing industry is 
caused by every independent variable except from regulation which once again shows that 
market conditions influencing competitive conduct have a significant effect on the value added 
of the whole industry. 
[Figure 4] 
 Figure 4 reflects the Impulse Response Functions for the aggregate manufacturing 
industry across the 19 countries of the sample. In particular, the diagram shows the 
                                                          
this particular shock did not cause any significant variations to the dynamics of the constituent series over 1995-
2014. 
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responsiveness of each variable in the Vector Error Correction model to each own standard 
deviation shock and to the shock of other variables. Financial underdevelopment appears to 
have a negative effect on the markup ratio over 8 periods; however, that effect is not continuous. 
There is also a positive response over four years showing that pricing decisions may vary 
according to the time needed by firms to adjust their financial needs. A similar pattern is 
exercised by the regulations proxy as the negative trend lasts for three periods. Export-
orientation tends to increase the markup ratio only over two periods and subsequently, it tends 
to reduce the value of the price-cost margin. This outcome contradicts the long-run relationship 
and thus, it captures a negative effect on sectorial pricing decisions.  
Productivity and the size of the manufacturing industry appear to have a stabilising 
effect on the markup ratio after the sixth period. This implies that productivity tends to increase 
the price-cost margin by less than 0.01% per annum implying that a 1% increase in productivity 
innovation causes a very small increase in the markup ratio before stabilisation. Moreover, the 
response of financial under-development and export-orientation to a markup standard deviation 
shock tends to stabilise after the fourth year following a positive response. Finally, the response 
of productivity and the size of the industry is negative over the initial 4 periods but subsequently, 
it steadily increases by less than 0.01% per annum.  
Effectively, it can be concluded that more financially under-developed sectors tend to 
decrease their markup ratio in the long-run to attract more customers, but in the short-run there 
are periods when they pursue over-pricing strategies in order to increase their revenue. Export-
oriented sectors tend to charge a higher price-cost margin in the long-run but in the very short-
run they tend to reduce the markup ratio in order to increase their market share. Productivity 
and the value of the manufacturing industry appear to have a stabilising and long-run positive 
effect on pricing decisions, while market regulations tend to reduce the value of the markup-
ratio. 
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The findings of this study complement the literature of imperfect competition and 
particularly, the studies of Martins et al. (1996), Molnár and Bottini (2010), Christopoulou and 
Vermeulen (2012) and Afonso and Costa (2013). The underlying argument is that 
manufacturing industries across the EU and the OECD group tend to adopt an imperfect 
competitive conduct as they can exercise their market power on the final selling price. Badinger 
(2007) and Bellone et al. (2016) also support this rationale because market share is an important 
contributor to such pricing decisions.  
To this end, factors enhancing imperfect competitive conduct across industries are 
crucial determinants of operational strategies. One of the most important factors corresponds 
to liquidity constraints faced by many industries because restrictions to funding may have a 
significant effect on their pricing strategies (Raddatz, 2006). Given that the long-run results 
suggest that industries facing tighter financial constraints tend to charge a lower price-cost 
margin, it is evident that funding is a crucial determinant of production decisions. Therefore, 
this study adds value to the literature of imperfect competition and liquidity constraints 
suggesting that the EU manufacturing industries tend to exercise their market power on the 
markup ratio; however, liquidity restrictions and regulations force them to adopt more 
competitive strategies by reducing the price-cost margin in order to expand their market share 
(Ollivaud and Turner, 2013; Braund and Raddatz, 2016). 
 Overall, this study provides significant evidence of imperfect competitive conduct 
across the manufacturing sectors of the constituent 19 EU countries. The price-cost margin set 
by those sectors is affected by the degree of access to available liquidity, the exposure to 
exporting activities and ultimately, the level of productivity when market regulation and 
aggregate manufacturing value added are controlled for. To this end, the insights of this paper 
significantly contribute to the literature of imperfect competition as the estimated results 
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complement the findings of many studies suggesting that market factors significantly influence 
the pricing decisions of the manufacturing firms. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The main scope of this study was to investigate the competitive structure across 19 EU 
manufacturing industries disaggregated into 10 2-digit NACE Rev.2 level sectors over 1995-
2014. The empirical results suggest the presence of imperfect competition across every 
manufacturing industry as the selling price of the final product exceeds the marginal cost of 
production. It is also found that markup ratios across the east and south EU countries appear to 
be higher compared to their north and central counterparts. This outcome captures the structural 
difference of those economies and the overall conditions developed over 1995-2014 (McKee 
et al., 2012; Karanikolos et al., 2013; Matsaganis and Leventi, 2014). 
 Subsequently, the pricing decisions of the constituent manufacturing industries were 
tested with respect to liquidity constraints, export orientation and the level of productivity when 
market regulation and the size of the whole industry is taken into account. The estimated results 
showed that financially underdeveloped industries tend to charge a lower price-cost margin in 
order to increase their market share and thus, their revenue. Export-oriented industries tend to 
charge a higher price-cost margin as they utilise any returns earned by international activities 
and finally, more productive sectors reflect productivity improvements in the markup ratio. 
Those results are consistent with many empirical studies across the literature (Hall, 1988; Busse, 
2002; Görg and Warzynski, 2003; De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012), therefore verifying the 
presence of imperfect competitive conduct across the 19 EU manufacturing industries.  
 According to those results, it is evident that the role of regulatory authorities is quite 
significant in the EU manufacturing industries as leading firms can exercise their market power 
on the markup ratio, thus limiting competition and exploiting consumer surplus. To this end, 
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the role of regulatory institutions must be more active in order to reform the markets by 
abolishing inefficient regulations erecting entry barriers and allowing new firms to operate in 
the industry. Moreover, financial institutions must provide additional funding to small and 
medium sized firms to encourage them to improve their technology and increase their 
production. If such policies are implemented, they will be able to compete with leading firms 
and supply their products to consumers under a competitive price level. For this reason, this 
study complements the findings of OECD (2014a, 2014b, 2018) and joins the call for more 
market-friendly policy frameworks that will force uncompetitive and inefficient firms to exit 
the market. Subsequently, new productive firms being able to operate efficiently will enter the 
market and build their share in order to satisfy consumer preferences and contribute to 
industrial growth through constant improvement and expansion in both domestic and 
international markets. 
 Overall, the present study complements the argument that EU manufacturing industries 
tend to charge a markup ratio reflecting different forms of imperfect competitive conduct, while 
such decisions are influenced by liquidity constraints, exporting activities and the level of 
productivity. 
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Appendix 
 
Price-cost margin estimation 
The methodological process employed for the estimation of the price-cost margin corresponds 
to the one presented by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker and Eeckhout 
(2017). In particular, the markup ratio is obtained by leveraging cost minimisation of an input 
factor in the production process. Consider that N heterogeneous firms operate within an 
economy having access to a common production technology. The production function of each 
firm i, where i=1,2,…,N is captured by 
𝑄𝑄(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)                                                                                               (A1) 
where 𝑄𝑄(. )is the production function,  𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the Hicks-neutral productivity factor which is 
heterogeneous across firms, 𝑉𝑉 = (𝑉𝑉1, … ,𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗) refers to the set of variable inputs utilised in the 
production process22 and 𝐾𝐾 is the capital stock. The Lagrangian objective function for the 
variable inputs is given by  
𝐿𝐿(𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖[𝑄𝑄(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]                                               (A2a) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 is the price of variable input 𝑉𝑉, 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the user cost of capital23, 𝜆𝜆 is the Lagrangian 
multiplier and 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a scalar. The first order condition with respect to the variable input 𝑉𝑉 is 
provided by 
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �                                                                                            (𝐴𝐴2𝑏𝑏) 
                                                          
22 De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) treat 𝑉𝑉 as a bundle of variable inputs and not as individual inputs, thus it is 
a scalar vector. 
23 As in the study of De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017), this paper also assumes that input markets are perfectly 
competitive and thus, 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉and 𝑓𝑓 are equal to marginal revenue. In any form of imperfect competition, either the 
marginal cost of inputs would be higher compared to perfect competition or input prices would be lower as a result 
of market power (De Loecker et al., 2016). 
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If this expression is multiplied by 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖and rearranged, the output elasticity of variable input 
𝑉𝑉 is obtained 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉 = 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 1
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
                                                                                       (𝐴𝐴3) 
According to this formulation, the Lagrange multiplier 𝜆𝜆 reflects the marginal cost of 
production according to the value of inputs. If we also assume that 𝑃𝑃 corresponds to the price 
of the final product, then the ratio 𝑃𝑃/𝜆𝜆 can be interpreted as the price markup over the marginal 
cost of production. Whenever this ratio is equal to unity, pricing decisions reflect perfect 
competitive conduct; any value higher than unity captures a form of imperfect competition in 
the market. Thereby, if we substitute this ratio in equation (A3), one obtains 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
                                                                                                                                (𝐴𝐴4) 
This expression includes two important elements: the ratio of revenue to the value of 
input 𝑉𝑉 and the elasticity of output with respect to the variable input. Consequently, it is not 
necessary to observe the demand function of the market or market conduct. However, the main 
conditions that must be met in order to imply equation (A4) refer to the assumption of a 
production function according to (1) and the perfect competitive conduct in the input markets24. 
The estimation of equation (A4) necessitates the observation of total sales 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 
the total variable cost of production ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . For this reason, an industry-specific Cobb-
Douglas production function is taken into account by adding logarithms to equation (A1) 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                              (A5a) 
                                                          
24 Moreover, there is no need to impose constant returns to scale, as it is assumed by Hall (1988) and Roeger 
(1995). Given that the Hall-Roeger formulation is estimated in first differences, it restricts the underlying demand 
system and thus, it results in consistently underestimated markup values (De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012). 
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At this stage, the suggestions of De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) are implemented in this 
expression to control for simultaneity and selection bias, through which an unbiased output 
elasticity value with respect to variable inputs will be obtained. Under this approach, an optimal 
input demand equation is needed which is included in the Lagrangian expression (A2a). Finally, 
if it is also assumed that the unobserved productivity term depends on the input factors utilised 
in the production process (Olley and Pakes, 1992), equation (A5a) is transformed into 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                  (A5b) 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) is the unobserved productivity term. If that term is assumed to follow 
an AR(1) process, the industry specific output elasticity is obtained by the moment condition 
𝐸𝐸[𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣)𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1] = 0                                                                                                                (A6) 
where the estimate 𝜓𝜓 is used to obtain the value of output elasticity with respect to variable 
inputs. Under this approach, it is assumed that variable inputs at time t respond to productivity 
shocks, and also, a degree of correlation emerges between the current and lagged values 
suggesting the persistence of those shocks. Consequently, the firm-level price-cost margin is 
estimated by  
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
                                                                                                                          (𝐴𝐴7) 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the constituent 19 EU manufacturing industries. 
Countries/ 
Variables 
Price-cost 
margin 
Credit to 
GDP 
Exports 
ratio 
Productivity 
per worker 
Regulation 
index 
Total 
value to 
GDP 
Austria 1.53 88.27 82.21 135.97 1.49 0.16 
Belgium 1.51 58.20 72.50 144.27 1.16 0.12 
Czech Republic 2.05 49.82 88.91 145.14 1.01 0.24 
Denmark 1.75 173.66 61.14 148.19 1.69 0.11 
Finland 1.76 93.55 68.16 126.66 1.88 0.14 
France 1.54 94.18 77.72 125.25 1.08 0.10 
Germany 1.53 79.40 83.61 121.75 1.70 0.20 
Greece 2.09 116.65 32.84 133.59 0.33 0.08 
Hungary 2.06 43.19 83.84 172.86 0.75 0.19 
Ireland 2.38 81.38 84.29 126.41 1.76 0.17 
Italy 1.70 88.91 83.08 118.68 0.64 0.13 
Luxemburg 1.34 89.65 78.38 122.51 1.63 0.05 
Netherlands 1.52 118.37 61.93 141.05 1.77 0.10 
Portugal 1.80 129.73 75.03 140.41 0.75 0.11 
Slovak Republic 2.23 49.90 87.91 175.03 0..83 0.19 
Slovenia 1.65 54.94 83.03 152.28 0.66 0.19 
Spain 1.74 130.00 69.37 157.85 0.75 0.12 
Sweden 1.99 131.20 72.75 124.76 1.81 0.14 
UK 1.46 138.48 73.82 148.60 1.83 0.08 
Source: OECD and The Worldwide Governance Indicators databases. 
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Table 2: Sectorial markup ratios of the 19 EU manufacturing industries over 1995-2014. 
Sector/Country Austria Belgium Czech 
Rep. 
Denmark Finland Franc
e 
German
y 
D: Manufacturing  
     industry 
1.54 1.53 1.95 1.56 1.96 1.57 1.46 
D10T12:  Food products, 
beverages and tobacco 
1.58 1.46 1.95 1.29 1.44 1.74 1.19 
D13T15:  Textiles, 
wearing apparel, leather 
and related products 
1.37 1.25 1.35 1.22 1.29 1.19 1.14 
D16T18:  Wood and paper 
products, and printing 
1.61 1.32 1.83 1.16 1.67 1.20 1.27 
D19:  Coke and refined 
petroleum products 
2.04 1.88 3.20 1.45 2.91 1.98 2.80 
D20T21:  Chemical and 
pharmaceutical products 
1.87 1.85 2.39 2.32 2.27 1.90 1.78 
D22T23:  Rubber and 
plastics products, and 
other non-metallic mineral 
products 
1.44 1.30 1.82 1.30 1.44 1.29 1.30 
D24T25:  Basic metals 
and fabricated metal 
products, except 
machinery and equipment 
1.51 1.16 1.60 1.12 1.42 1.20 1.19 
D26T28:  Machinery and 
equipment 
1.51 1.33 1.66 1.33 2.02 1.38 1.30 
D29T30:  Transport 
equipment 
1.83 1.10 1.96 1.08 1.15 1.38 1.36 
D31T33:  Furniture; other 
manufacturing; repair and 
installation of machinery 
and equipment 
1.31 1.17 1.55 1.40 1.23 1.12 1.07 
Source: Estimations of equation (1). 
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Sector/Country Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Luxemburg Netherlands Portugal 
D: Manufacturing  
     industry 
1.87 1.87 2.01 1.79 1.38 1.62 1.69 
D10T12:  Food products, 
beverages and tobacco 
1.97 1.41 2.61 1.78 1.27 1.86 1.68 
D13T15:  Textiles, 
wearing apparel, leather 
and related products 
1.29 1.13 1.20 1.54 1.94 1.37 1.27 
D16T18:  Wood and 
paper products, and 
printing 
1.92 1.36 2.38 1.67 1.29 1.34 1.71 
D19:  Coke and refined 
petroleum products 
2.88 2.82 2.52 2.12 1.05 1.50 2.25 
D20T21:  Chemical and 
pharmaceutical products 
1.85 2.27 3.17 1.68 2.06 2.25 1.68 
D22T23:  Rubber and 
plastics products, and 
other non-metallic 
mineral products 
1.66 1.61 1.51 1.47 1.30 1.41 1.63 
D24T25:  Basic metals 
and fabricated metal 
products, except 
machinery and 
equipment 
2.02 1.32 1.37 1.49 1.04 1.34 1.24 
D26T28:  Machinery and 
equipment 
1.96 1.82 2.34 1.44 1.20 1.67 1.49 
D29T30:  Transport 
equipment 
1.59 2.21 1.14 1.38 1.56 1.66 1.29 
D31T33:  Furniture; 
other manufacturing; 
repair and installation of 
machinery and 
equipment 
1.72 1.30 2.06 1.62 1.12 1.10 1.27 
Source: Estimations of equation (1). 
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Sector/Country Slovak Rep. Slovenia Spain Sweden UK 
D: Manufacturing  
     industry 
2.00 1.56 1.57 1.95 1.41 
D10T12:  Food products, 
beverages and tobacco 
1.88 1.34 1.64 1.60 1.29 
D13T15:  Textiles, wearing 
apparel, leather and related 
products 
1.25 1.03 1.26 1.37 1.18 
D16T18:  Wood and paper 
products, and printing 
2.24 1.29 1.37 1.68 1.23 
D19:  Coke and refined petroleum 
products 
2.46 1.01 3.63 2.52 1.20 
D20T21:  Chemical and 
pharmaceutical products 
2.40 1.98 1.73 2.37 1.75 
D22T23:  Rubber and plastics 
products, and other non-metallic 
mineral products 
1.89 1.39 1.36 1.42 1.16 
D24T25:  Basic metals and 
fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
2.17 1.32 1.29 1.54 1.09 
D26T28:  Machinery and 
equipment 
1.49 1.30 1.34 1.95 1.12 
D29T30:  Transport equipment 1.99 1.44 1.40 1.71 1.13 
D31T33:  Furniture; other 
manufacturing; repair and 
installation of machinery and 
equipment 
1.72 1.25 1.29 1.47 1.31 
Source: Estimations of equation (1). 
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Table 3: Pesaran’s cross-section dependence tests. 
Variables Scaled LM test CD test 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 
μ 22.20** 
[0.00] 
21.93** 
[0.00] 
19.61** 
[0.00] 
16.94** 
[0.00] 
16.87** 
[0.00] 
15.85** 
[0.00] 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 18.93** 
[0.00] 
12.64** 
[0.00] 
13.29** 
[0.00] 
9.58** 
[0.00] 
8.21** 
[0.00] 
9.03** 
[0.00] 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 109.68** 
[0.00] 
106.38** 
[0.00] 
100.85** 
[0.00] 
45.88** 
[0.00] 
45.35** 
[0.00] 
44.21** 
[0.00] 
𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓 88.95** 
[0.00] 
88.85** 
[0.00] 
85.61** 
[0.00] 
39.48** 
[0.00] 
39.42** 
[0.00] 
38.79** 
[0.00] 
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 10.75** 
[0.00] 
9.95** 
[0.00] 
8.73** 
[0.00] 
4.84** 
[0.00] 
4.69** 
[0.00] 
4.78** 
[0.00] 
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 40.47** 
[0.00] 
40.42** 
[0.00] 
38.64** 
[0.00] 
24.67** 
[0.00] 
24.81** 
[0.00] 
21.12** 
[0.00] 
Notes: The null hypothesis denotes the absence of cross-sectional dependence in the series. The results are based 
on Pesaran’s (2004) LM and CD tests. The values in brackets are p-values. 
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
** Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 4: Pesaran’s panel unit root tests. 
Variables  
 CIPS CIPS* 
μ -1.741     [0.10] -1.780     [0.09] 
∆𝜇𝜇 -9.552** [0.00] -9.316** [0.00] 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 -3.783** [0.00] -3.889** [0.00] 
∆𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 -11.62** [0.00] -11.56** [0.00] 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥  0.333     [0.73]  1.015     [0.31] 
∆𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 -5.732** [0.00] -4.647** [0.00] 
𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓  0.783     [0.43]  1.499     [0.15] 
∆𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓 -7.097** [0.00] -6.976** [0.00] 
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 -0.896     [0.37] -0.979     [0.35] 
∆𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 -9.467** [0.00] -9.339** [0.00] 
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣  1.867     [0.09]  1.688     [0.10] 
∆𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 -8.061** [0.00] -8.141** [0.00] 
Notes: The values reflect t-statistic values. ∆ denotes first differences. Pesaran’s (2007) test is conducted including 
an intercept only. CIPS* corresponds to the truncated CIPS test. Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests 
stationarity in at least one manufacturing industry of the panel. The results are reported at lag k=3. The critical 
values for the test are -2.40 at 1% and -2.21 at 5% level of significance.  
** Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 5: Panel cointegration tests. 
𝜇𝜇 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓,𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥,𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓, 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟,𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔 16.63** [0.00] 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝 20.47** [0.00] 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 -0.17      [0.42] 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣 𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑜𝑜 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 -0.53      [0.31] 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 -3.46**  [0.00] 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 -2.75**  [0.00] 
𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑜𝑜 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 -0.81      [0.23] 
𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 -7.54**  [0.00] 
𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 -5.75**  [0.00] 
Notes: 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔 refers to the group mean Durbin-Hausman statistic and 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝 is the panel statistic as developed by 
Westerlund (2008). The bandwidth selection  𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 corresponds to the largest integer less than 4( 𝑇𝑇100)2/9 as proposed 
by Newey and West (1994). The remaining statistics refer to Pedroni’s (2004) statistics which are one-sided tests 
with a critical value of -1.64. 
The values in brackets are p-values. 
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance 
** Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 6: Structural stability tests. 
𝜇𝜇 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓,𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥,𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓, 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟,𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣) 
Maximum LR F-statistic 4.82 [0.10] 
Maximum Wald F-statistic 9.64 [0.10] 
Exp LR F-statistic 1.03 [0.16] 
Exp Wald F-statistic 2.66 [0.08] 
Average LR F-statistic 1.56 [0.15] 
Average Wald F-statistic 3.13 [0.15] 
F-statistic 4.05 [0.72] 
Scaled F-statistic 8.11 [0.24] 
Notes: The structural stability tests are obtained according to the Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint test 
(Andrews, 1993; Andrews and Ploberger, 1994) and the multiple breakpoint test proposed by Bai and Perron 
(2003). The p-values are calculated using Hansen's (1997) method. 
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance 
** Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance. 
 
 
Table 7: Long-run estimates.  
Variables CCE  FMOLS GMM ARDL 
μ 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 -0.022** (2.69) - 0.001   (0.92) -0.061*  (2.10) -0.064*    
(2.21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 0.216**  (5.78) 0.143** (5.69) 0.130** (6.17) 0.041       (1.86) 
𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓 0.352**  (7.28) 0.393** (10.21) 0.359** (10.69) 0.418**   (4.92) 
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 -0.043*  (-2.02) -0.006   (-0.24) -0.023    (-0.86) -0.683** (-
4.85) 
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 0.966**  (18.71) 0.406** (10.44) 0.412**  
(11.36) 
0.582**   (5.98) 
𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 79.74**  [0.00] 43.11** [0.00] 105.20** [0.00] 88.23** [0.00] 
𝑅𝑅2 0.97 0.89 0.89 0.85 
Notes: The results of the CCE are obtained by employing the common correlated effects technique proposed by 
Pesaran (2006). The standard errors of FMOLS are robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. The instruments list in the GMM system consists of the lagged values of the endogenous 
explanatory variables. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The numbers in brackets are p-values. 
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
** Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 8: Heterogeneous panel non-causality results. 
Dependent  
variables 
Sources of short-run causation (independent variables) 
 ∆𝜇𝜇 ∆𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 ∆𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ∆𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓 ∆𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 ∆𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 
∆𝜇𝜇 - 2.22* 
[0.02] 
3.92** 
[0.00] 
2.32* 
[0.02] 
2.00* 
[0.04] 
1.74 
[0.08] 
∆𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 0.68 
[0.49] 
- 0.19 
[0.84] 
1.02 
[0.30] 
3.12** 
[0.00] 
0.83 
[0.40] 
∆𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 1.17 
[0.23] 
7.47** 
[0.00] 
- 0.36 
[0.71] 
2.62** 
[0.00] 
1.94 
[0.05] 
∆𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓 0.81 
[0.41] 
0.53 
[0.59] 
-1.81 
[0.06] 
- -0.05 
[0.95] 
3.30** 
[0.00] 
∆𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 2.09* 
[0.03] 
3.50** 
[0.00] 
1.16 
[0.24] 
1.53 
[0.12] 
- 2.23* 
[0.02] 
∆𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 3.11** 
[0.00] 
2.03* 
[0.04] 
3.34** 
[0.00] 
3.63** 
[0.00] 
-0.04 
[0.79] 
- 
Notes: The values are the Zbar-statistics as reported by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012). The lag length is set at 
k=2 according to SIC. The numbers in brackets denote p-values. 
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
** Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance. 
 
